Dismiss, upset and breach - just don’t suspend : the

false dawn of damages for future losses. A case

note on Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS

Foundation Trust [2011] UKSC 58, [2012] 2 AC 22 by Marson, James
Dismiss, upset and breach - just don’t suspend : the false 
dawn of damages for future losses. A case note on 
Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation 
Trust [2011] UKSC 58, [2012] 2 AC 22
MARSON, James
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/8866/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
MARSON, James (2013). Dismiss, upset and breach - just don’t suspend : the false 
dawn of damages for future losses. A case note on Edwards v Chesterfield Royal 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2011] UKSC 58, [2012] 2 AC 22. Web journal of 
current legal issues, 19 (1). 
Repository use policy
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the 
individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print 
one copy of any article(s) in SHURA to facilitate their private study or for non-
commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or 
use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain.
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk
28/11/2014 21:01Marson
Page 1 of 9http://webjcli.org/rt/printerFriendly/206/276
WEB JOURNAL OF CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, VOL 19,
NO 1 (2013)
Dismiss, Upset and Breach - Just Don’t Suspend: The
False Dawn of Damages for Future Losses. A Case
Note on Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS
Foundation Trust [2011] UKSC 58, [2012] 2 AC 22
JAMES MARSON B.A. (HONS); LL.M; PH.D.
Senior Lecturer in Law, Sheffield Hallam University
J.Marson@shu.ac.uk
© 2013 James Marson
First published in the Web Journal of Current Legal Issues
Citation: Marson J, 'Dismiss, Upset and Breach - Just Don’t Suspend: The False Dawn
of Damages for Future Losses: A Case Note on Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital
NHS Foundation Trust', (2013) 19(1) Web JCLI
ABSTRACT
On 14 December 2011 the Supreme Court handed down its judgment regarding
the extent to which damages awards in instances of dismissal can take into
account future losses, see Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation
Trust [2011] UKSC 58, [2012] 2 AC 22. The Court of Appeal ([2010] EWCA Civ
571) had held there was no principle of law why damages could not include
future losses where an employer had breached the contract by not following
contractual disciplinary and dismissal procedures. The question considered by the
Court of Appeal was whether the status quo of restricting such awards to a
statutory maximum (following the ACAS Code) and/or to the contractual notice
period plus reasonable period of time for the procedures to be completed, was
applicable. Alternatively, the Court of Appeal could move away from this
traditional purely-contractual approach and enable damages to take into account
those future losses associated with an unfair / wrongful dismissal. This was the
approach taken. The Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Appeal, decided to
follow the former, traditional approach. As such, its decision has broad
implications for employers who flout contractual disciplinary and dismissal
procedures, and it has further implications for employers who choose to suspend
individuals rather than to dismiss them. Indeed, the case confirms that it may
likely be more certain and financially beneficial for employers to choose to
dismiss an individual rather than to potentially invoke greater costs and damages
awards by choosing to suspend.
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1. BACKGROUND
To begin, it is important to clarify some preliminary key points. First, since 1971
and the Industrial Relations Act, every qualifying employee has the right not to
be unfairly dismissed. However, the employment relationship will be terminated
at some point, and it has become commonplace for the notice period required by
the parties to be incorporated into the contract itself, or through some other
means such as a works handbook. There are greater restrictions to terminating a
contract of employment for a qualifying employee who has protection against
unfair dismissal, (1) but insofar as the employer holds a reasonable belief (2) of,
for example, misconduct; he/she has conducted a reasonable investigation into
the matter, (3) and the decision to discipline or dismiss the individual falls in what
is known as the ‘band of reasonable responses’, (4) the dismissal will be
fair.Where an employer adheres to the relevant notice period, there is a lawful
dismissal at common law. If the employer can justify a decision to terminate a
qualifying employee’s contract with correct notice through compliance with the
relevant statutory requirements (identified largely in the Employment Rights Act
1996), the dismissal will also be fair. However, an employer will not have to
provide the notice period (or payment in lieu) where the individual has
committed some fundamental breach which will allow the employer to accept the
repudiation and terminate the relationship.Due to the significance of terminating
a contract of employment without notice (known as a summary dismissal), and to
protect both parties from claims of wrongful / unfair dismissal, employment
contracts began to expressly identify the applicable disciplinary and dismissal
procedures. These aided the parties in understanding the mechanisms through
which disputes would be handled before the employer took a decision to dismiss.
In the absence of a justifiable reason to end the contract, an employer who
terminated the contract without notice would have committed a wrongful
dismissal. The Edwards case came to prominence because of the arguments
presented by the Court of Appeal, subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court,
as to the extent of damages payable. There are two routes to seek a remedy when
an individual’s contract of employment is terminated without notice - the
common law wrongful dismissal route, and the statutory (but more heavily
regulated) unfair dismissal route. Remedies in wrongful dismissal have been
based on the classic contract law basis of damages, and the possibility of the
equitable remedy of injunctions to prevent the application of a dismissal in breach
of contract. (5) The statutory remedy of unfair dismissal provides the remedies of
re-instatement, reengagement and compensation in the form of damages. Here
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compensation comprises of a basic award, compensatory award and a
discretionary additional award. The current maximum (1st February 2012) is
£85,200 and tribunals are unable to exceed this figure.
2. NON-COMPLIANCE WITH DISCIPLINARY
PROCEDURES
To substantiate a lawful and a fair dismissal the employer is required to follow the
required procedure before the decision to dismiss. This will be identified in the
contract itself and/or the employer will adhere to the procedures identified in the
Code of Practice 1 - Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures established by the
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS). The ACAS Code provides
that where an employer has not (without good reason) followed the procedure
before the decision to discipline or dismiss, the tribunal is entitled to raise the
compensation payable to the employee by up to 25%. Where an employer has not
followed the contractual disciplinary procedures, previous case law identified the
extent of damages available to the employee. Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL
13, [2003] 1 A.C. 518 sought to restrict damages to the pay that the individual
would have received had the notice period been worked. Johnson had sought rely
on a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence as a foundation of a claim,
at common law, in damages for the manner, not substance, of his dismissal.
Johnson argued that a consequence of his dismissal included him suffering a
mental breakdown and that he was unable to work again. The House of Lords
refused to extend the implied term to enable damages to be awarded on this basis
and struck out the claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. Each member
of the Lords, apart from Lord Steyn, agreed that to enable such an extension of the
law in this respect would be contrary to the intention of Parliament which had
already established rules regarding maximums in the calculation of damages
awards in relation to unfair dismissals. Despite academic and judicial disquiet
with this judgment, Johnson gave rise to the term ‘Johnson exclusion area.’ The
Johnson exclusion area relates to the denial of damages being recoverable for a
breach of contract relating to the manner (not substance) of the dismissal.Gunton v
Richmond-upon-Thames London Borough Council [1981] Ch 448 was a second
significant case which extended the availability of compensation to include
payment of wages for the period of time of a reasonable investigation (had the
employer conducted one) before the decision to dismiss. However, the case law
made certain that these were the extent to the damages available to an individual
dismissed in the breach of disciplinary and dismissal procedures.This restriction
of the damages available gains significance when considering Mr. Edwards’
dismissal.
3. EDWARDS’ DISMISSAL
The Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust was established on 1
January 2005 (it was formally the Chesterfield and North Derbyshire Royal
Hospital NHS Trust). Mr. Edwards was employed as a consultant trauma and
orthopaedic surgeon at the Trust under a contract incorporating, pertinent to his
claim, paragraph 8, which provided that the employment contract was subject to
three months’ notice on either side. Further, paragraph 13 stated that in matters of
alleged professional misconduct, Mr. Edwards would be subject to a separate
procedure negotiated and agreed by the Local Negotiating Committee.Mr.
Edwards was notified on 22 December 2005 that disciplinary proceedings were
28/11/2014 21:01Marson
Page 4 of 9http://webjcli.org/rt/printerFriendly/206/276
being instituted against him regarding allegations from a female patient that he
had performed an inappropriate internal examination. Mr. Edwards denied that
such an examination had taken place. The nature of such an allegation
necessitated the use of the procedures which were established in the ‘Disciplinary
Procedures for Hospital and Community Medical and Dental Staff.’ A disciplinary
hearing was held on 9 April 2006, and on 10 February the disciplinary panel
concluded that Mr. Edwards should be summarily dismissed for both his gross
personal and professional misconduct. On 16 February Mr. Edwards received by
letter the detail of the panel’s findings and reasons for its decision.Following Mr.
Edwards’ dismissal on 10 February 2006, an internal appeal was sort but was
dismissed on 24 April and on 12 May 2006 Mr. Edwards began unfair dismissal
proceedings. One of the bases on which his claim was made was that his
dismissal was unfair due to the ‘inappropriately constituted’ disciplinary panel.
Mr. Edwards argued that a properly constituted panel would not have made
incorrect findings and consequently he would not have been dismissed. However,
prior to the pre-hearing review, Mr. Edwards withdrew his application for unfair
dismissal. On 15 August 2008 Mr. Edwards began proceedings in the High Court
for wrongful dismissal, again on the basis of the breach of procedural rules
regarding his dismissal.Mr. Edwards’ claim essentially had two strands. The first
was his dismissal in breach of contract. The second, and perhaps much more
significant and of the wider importance, was the damage to his reputation. Whilst
there was no action taken by the General Medical Council to strike Mr. Edwards
from the register, his dismissal by the Trust for the alleged offence meant he
would be unable to work in the NHS again, and his opportunities for earnings
would have been significantly reduced had he sought employment in the private
sector. It is this second issue which was fundamental to the case as Mr. Edwards
considered his wrongful dismissal was going to cause him ongoing financial loss.
As the law currently stood, Mr. Edwards was entitled, if he successfully argued
wrongful dismissal, to damages consisting of the three months’ wages he would
have received under the contractual notice period (plus the Gunton extension for
wages whilst the Trust complied with the disciplinary procedures). Mr. Edwards
argued that had he not been wrongfully dismissed, he would have continued to
work in his role as a consultant orthopaedic surgeon until his retirement in 2022.
Consequently he had suffered a loss of earnings, including future earnings, in
excess of £3.8 million.To be able to claim future losses in excess of the Johnson and
Gunton exclusion and extension areas (the existing case law restrictions), Mr.
Edwards had to demonstrate that his future losses were separate and not
subsumed in an unfair dismissal claim.
4. THE FIRST CASE
The Trust, in its defence to Mr. Edwards’ claim, applied to the court on 17
February 2009, for an order that Mr. Edwards' claimed damages for losses be
restricted to the three months' contractual notice period as required in his
contract. District Judge Jones acceded to the application. This led to an appeal in
the High Court ([2009] EWHC 2011 (QB), [2009] I.R.L.R. 822) but only allowed on
the basis that were breach of contract established, that compensation be extended
to the period of time it would have taken to conduct the disciplinary procedure
correctly (applying the ‘Gunton extension’).
4. THE COURT OF APPEAL
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The Court of Appeal considered the causes of action available to Mr. Edwards and
identified, in the first instance, that an action for breach of contract would be
applicable. Having established a breach of contract had taken place by the Trust
wrongly constituting the disciplinary panel, the next issue was which remedies
would be available. It identified that an injunction to restrain the threatened
breach of contract in addition to damages, and a claim of unfair dismissal, were
all available to Mr. Edwards. Significantly, the Court of Appeal did not follow
Gunton in its reasoning and provided that there was nothing in principle which
would restrict an individual's claim of damages for just wages during the notice
period and the completion of a disciplinary procedure. Future losses were
available.This was a very controversial decision and caused widespread disquiet
amongst commentators, and naturally, employers. By making possible claims
which went far beyond contractual loss of earnings and breach of procedure,
employers would have been exposed to significantly greater damages actions.
Presumably, the ruling would have ensured more effective adherence to statutory
and contractual disciplinary and dismissal procedures than could possibly have
been achieved through the (ineffective, widely criticised, and now repealed - see
Gibbons, 2007) Employment Act 2002 (Dispute Resolution) Regulations 2004, or
the ACAS code.
6. THE SUPREME COURT
The basis of the appeal in Edwards required the Supreme Court to consider two
questions; No. 1: whether the reasoning in Johnson precluded recovery of damages
for the manner of an unfair dismissal which arose due to a breach of an express
term of the employment contract (unlike in Johnson with breach of an implied
term - trust and confidence); and if so, No. 2: whether the claim by Mr. Edwards
subsequently fell into the Johnson exclusion area.In the Supreme Court, Lord
Dyson began by considering the requirement of the implied term of maintaining
trust and confidence between the parties (Mahmud v Bank of Credit and Commerce
International SA [1998] AC 20) and how this may relate to an employer causing an
individual loss as a result of a wrongful or unfair dismissal. However, despite
adverse effects on the individual, those effects which are related to the dismissal,
not independent of it, are not recoverable. As put by Lord Mance, at paragraph
92, ‘… a dismissal is wrongful where there is... no basis for summary dismissal.
Other circumstances (such as the reasons for the failure, the employer’s state of
mind or the impact on the employee) are simply irrelevant to the breach or the
loss recoverable for it.’The Employment Rights Act 1996 provides for a strict
method of calculating the award of damages, and by necessity it precludes any
award taking into account distress or upset which the employee suffers in relation
to the unfair dismissal (see Eastwood and Another v Magnox Electric plc [2004]
UKHL 35, [2005] 1 AC 503). Presumably (but erroneously), the fact that an
employee has been unfairly dismissed will naturally involve some element of
distress and upset which Parliament must have included or at the very least
considered when identifying the award of damages.The majority of the Supreme
Court held that the first question was answered in the affirmative and
consequently the Johnson exclusion area continues. With regards to the second
question, Lord Dyson identified that the employer’s failure to act fairly in
determining a decision to dismiss does not, of itself, cause an employee financial
loss. It is when the employee is dismissed that the loss arises and as such it is
related to the dismissal, not the steps leading to the dismissal. What is of interest
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is Lord Dyson’s consideration of the decision provided by Lord Nichols in
Eastwood where Nichols identified that this second issue regarding losses
sustained in the steps leading to a dismissal could cause an employee financial
loss. The example he provides is where an employee is suspended rather than
dismissed. Indeed in his summing up, at paragraph 60 Lord Dyson, in allowing
the appeal of the employer, stated that the position of the claimant would have
been completely different had he been suspended not dismissed.Mr. Edwards’
loss was, held the Supreme Court, as a consequence of the dismissal, not
independent of it, and therefore within the Johnson exclusion area - hence
damages were restricted to the notice period and would not extend to future
losses.
7. GUNTON EXTENSION V FUTURE LOSSES
Lord Dyson considered, beginning at para. 19, the Johnson exclusion area
explaining that this series of settled case law (Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909]
AC 488 onwards) had established the limitation for an employee to recover
damages in respect of the manner of his/her dismissal. A concern in Johnson was
that there existed an express term, in the same way as applied to the contract of
Edwards, which identified the manner and form in which disciplinary and
dismissal procedures should take place. As such this went beyond merely an
implied term to maintain trust and confidence between the parties. However, it
appears one of the major influences of the decision of the majority of the Supreme
Court was of the Employment Rights Act 1996 Part X, and the ACAS Code which
identifies specifically that where the relevant contractual disciplinary and
dismissal procedure is not complied with, a tribunal is entitled to raise or lower,
as appropriate, any award (to the relevant maximum) by no more than 25%. As
such, Parliament had clearly intended to cover situations where a dismissal had
taken place contrary to the contractual terms and conditions. This, felt the
majority of the Supreme Court, bound them to reject the Court of Appeal’s ruling
and to return instead to the common law restriction on the award of damages in
respect of breach of terms and conditions. Further, at paragraph 44, Lord Dyson
identified that whilst a breach of the disciplinary process will amount of breach of
contract, the remedy lies in obtaining an injunction to prevent the effect of any
subsequent dismissal, pending the correct administration of the procedures rather
than extending the common law principle of damages for future losses. Therefore,
and on that basis, Mr. Edwards already had a cause of action at that stage and in
following Lord Nicholls’ analysis in Eastwood, Mr. Edwards had a cause of action
before his dismissal which must consequently be unimpaired by his subsequent
dismissal. Lord Dyson’s judgment was a rather depressing retreat to the status
quo and failed to provide a remedy which would have provided greater
prominence to the contractual terms and conditions relating to disciplinary
procedures. As it currently stands, the law unnecessarily burdens and restricts
itself due to a seemingly misreading of the ratio of Johnson.The more protective
and enlightened approached was offered by Lady Hale, who in the minority, took
the opposite view to Lord Dyson and would have rejected the employer’s appeal.
The main argument presented by Lady Hale was that the rights created by
Parliament in 1971 (the Industrial Relations Act) for an employee not to be
unfairly dismissed, and the subsequent protection provided through statute and
the ACAS Code regarding the computation of damages, were established after the
common law and were, according to Lady Hale, to complement those common
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law rights not to replace or to supersede them. Parliament’s action was taken
because most employees had very few rights under the contract of employment.
Lady Hale presents a compelling argument as to why protection should have
been provided to Mr. Edwards. She identified in comparison with Addis that
whilst in Addis there was no contractually agreed process for his dismissal, there
was such a contractually agreed process evident in the relationship between Mr.
Edwards and the Trust. This led to discussion of the Johnson exclusion area. But
Lady Hale did not agree with the other Lords of the ratio in their interpretation of
Johnson. In relation to this was particularly the potential for the common law
providing a remedy which was expressly not provided for by Parliament.
However Lady Hale argued that Parliament acted to require employers to act
fairly when they dismissed their employees and there was nothing to suggest that
Parliament intended to limit the entitlement of those employees who had a
contractual right to a job, not to be dismissed without cause. Therefore Lady Hale
could not agree with any distinction between the consequences of dismissal and
the consequences of other breaches of the contract in access to, or the calculation
of, damages. Lady Hale concluded her arguments by identifying that she could
not see how it might be possible for an employee with a contractual right to a
particular disciplinary process to enforce the right in advance through use of an
injunction but to be precluded from claiming damages for its breach after the
event.A limiting factor to the reasoning of Addis when applied in a modern
context, and viewing employment law in a relational contract theory context, is
that it clearly misses the personal dimension underpinning such agreements. To
apply ‘pure’ contractual principles and limitations to them appears antiquated
and ill-conceived. For example, to exclude damages for the distress and
unpleasantness involved in being wrongfully or unfairly dismissed quite clearly
attempts to force a commercial contractual understanding to a personal
relationship. Indeed, in Autoclenz v Belcher [2009] EWCA Civ 1046, [2010] IRLR 70,
the Court of Appeal had already explained the application of contractual
principles relating to employment status. The general rules outlining that a party
who signs a contract is bound by it, a term will not be implied if its effect is to
contradict an express term, and the equitable remedy of rectification is available
to the parties where the written contract constitutes a mistake from that which the
parties had agreed orally. That is to say, the courts will not, nor should they,
attempt to re-write the rules of contract law simply for the purposes of
employment relationships. However, what is of interest is the judgment of Aikens
LJ and how the inequality of the bargaining powers of the parties has a significant
effect on the contracting between those parties, and how contracts of
employment, compared with general commercial agreements, should be viewed
differently:
“The circumstances in which contracts relating to work or services
are concluded are very different from those in which commercial
contracts between parties of equal bargaining power are agreed. I
accept that frequently organizations which are offering work or
requiring services are in a position to dictate the written terms which
the other party is bound to accept.” (para 92).
Employment is frequently a defining feature of an individual (per Lord Millett in
Johnson) and the development and judicial acknowledgement of the implied terms
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shared between the parties would surely convince the judiciary to adopt a more
proactive stance when faced with the appropriate enforcement of the contract and
computation of damages for breach.
9. IMPLICATIONS OF THE JUDGMENT
The decision of the Court of Appeal had caused concern for employers due to the
possibility of damages awards consisting of future losses flowing from the
dismissal. Where employers dismissed an employee in contravention of
contractual terms and conditions relating to disciplinary and dismissal
procedures, employers faced the invidious position of paying substantial
damages due to their failure.As such, the Supreme Court has provided greater
certainty and protection for employers by restricting the award of damages in
unfair dismissal cases to the relevant statutory-imposed maximum and, in
relation to claims under the common law, to the contractual notice period due,
along with a calculation of the length of time a reasonably conducted disciplinary
/ dismissal hearing would have taken. However, it is worthy of note that the
majority decision by the Supreme Court was four to three. It may be possible that
future losses could be recoverable if the persuasive arguments presented by Lady
Hale are considered in detail in the future. Indeed Brodie (2011), in a critical
analysis of relational contract theory and its (mis)application to employment
relationships, states ‘It would not be at all surprising if, in time, damages for
upset becomes available for breach of the employment contract but not in respect
of other types of relational contracts’ (p. 248).
10. CONCLUSIONS
The decision in Edwards, whilst somewhat predictable and maintaining the status
quo, is nonetheless unfortunate–certainly for employees. The result of this case is
simply that employers have guidance from the Supreme Court that failure to
follow contractual disciplinary and dismissal procedures which have led to the
decision to dismiss will merely result in either a Gunton claim for damages or a
maximum 25% uplift in line with the ACAS Code for unfair dismissal. Regardless
of the consequences for the individual, damages will be limited unless
independent of the dismissal. Neither the contractual or statutory approach is
particularly onerous for employers, the only concern would be where an
employer chooses to suspend an individual in breach of the contract, this,
according to the Edwards case, would enable a claim for damages on the basis of
future losses. The advice for employers who are unsure of, or unwilling to follow,
disciplinary procedures is clear - dismiss, don’t suspend.
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